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Is parochial altruism an attribute of individual behavior? This is the question we address
with an experiment. We examine whether the individual pro-sociality that is revealed in
the public goods and trust games when interacting with fellow group members helps
predict individual parochialism, as measured by the in-group bias (i.e., the difference in
these games in pro-sociality when interacting with own group members as compared
with members of another group). We find that it is not. An examination of the Big-5
personality predictors of each behavior reinforces this result: they are different. In short,
knowing how pro-social individuals are with respect to fellow group members does not
help predict their parochialism.
Keywords: parochial altruism, in-group bias, pro-sociality, personality
Introduction
Is parochial altruism an attribute of individual behavior? It is well known from experiments that
there is an in-group bias in pro-sociality at a population level. That is, populations reveal that
they are nicer to members of their own group than to those of the out-group (e.g., see surveys in
Balliet et al., 2014 and Lane, 2015). This is true even for “minimal groups” in which bias is created
from the assignment of arbitrary group-memberships (Tajfel, 1970). What is not known is whether
the individual variation in the level of pro-sociality (the ‘altruism’) is connected to the individual
variation of the in-group bias (the ‘parochialism’). Are those individuals who are most pro-social
to insiders also the individuals who are most ‘parochial’ in their pro-sociality? This is the question
we address with an experiment1.
The question is important because both the social identity and the evolutionary accounts of the
emergence of ‘altruism’ would seem to predict such an individual association with ‘parochialism’.
1‘Altruism’ is sometimes used to capture a very speciﬁc attention to the interests of others: the individual’s utility function
representation of his or her preferences is a weighted sum of own and the other person’s pay-oﬀs. It is also often used more
loosely to describe the motive for behavior that is generally ‘nice’ toward others (that is attends to the interests of the other in
one way or another). This could arise from many speciﬁc forms of motivation and not just ‘altruism’ in the narrow speciﬁc
sense of the weighted sum utility function. For example, in many settings behaving ‘nicely’ could arise from a concern with
efficiency or equality. We assume here that ‘altruism’ is used in the general rather than speciﬁc sense and so stands generally
for other regarding behavior (whatever its precise motivation). Hence, we will hereafter typically refer to individual pro-
sociality rather than individual ‘altruism’ to avoid any possible confusion.
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For example, the more you identify with your group under
social identity and self categorization theory (i.e., the more
parochial you are; Turner et al., 1987), the greater should be
your anticipated within-group pro-sociality (because this is how
you identify your self). Likewise, the Choi and Bowles (2007)
agent based simulations predict (under some conditions) the
evolutionary emergence of ‘altruism’ but only when combined at
the individual level with parochialism.
We address the question in two ways. First, we adopt
a revealed preference approach. We examine whether the
individual pro-sociality that is revealed in two person public
goods (PG) and trust (T) games when interacting with fellow
group members helps predict individual parochialism. For this
purpose, we measure pro-sociality by the level of ‘contributing’
in the PG and the level of ‘giving’ and ‘returning’ in T; and
we measure parochialism by the extent to which individuals’
pro-sociality toward fellow group members does not extend to
members of another group (that is, the in-group bias).
The ‘contribution’ rate in PG and the ‘return’ rate in T
are commonly taken as an indices of pro-sociality because the
selﬁshly rational individual contributes zero and because a variety
of speciﬁc non-selﬁsh motivations (like altruism, inequality
aversion and a concern for efficiency) predict increasing
‘contribution’ with the strength of these motivations (e.g., see
Elster, 2007, on theoretical justiﬁcations for this and Camerer,
2003, for a summary of the experimental evidence). The ‘giving’
rate in T is not so easily interpreted because a non-zero gift is
consistent with selﬁshness, when a selﬁsh ﬁrst mover expects (for
whatever reason) that the second mover will ‘return’ a more than
compensating amount, as well as with a variety of pro-social
motivations like altruism, etc. With this in mind, ‘giving’ in T,
is often treated as index, but a noisy one, of pro-sociality. Three
possible group contingent measures of pro-sociality follow.
(1) General pro-sociality (i.e., when there are no groups)
(2) In-group pro-sociality (i.e., when both individuals belong to
same group)
(3) Out-group pro-sociality (i.e., when the two individuals
belong to diﬀerent groups).
We now deﬁne the following for each individual.
• In-group bias = in-group pro-sociality minus out-group pro-
sociality.
• In-group ‘love’ = in-group pro-sociality minus general pro-
sociality.
• Out-group ‘hate’= general pro-sociality minus out-group pro-
sociality.
The in-group bias is a natural indicator of parochialism
because it captures the extent to which insiders are treated
diﬀerently to outsiders: it is a measure of the extent to which pro-
socialitry is restricted to fellow group members. Furthermore,
it can conveniently be decomposed with these deﬁnitions into
in-group ‘love’ plus out-group ‘hate.’
With the background expectation from social identity theory
and the Choi and Bowles (2007) evolutionary account, our ﬁrst
approach to the question can now be summarized through H1.
H1: Greater/lesser individual in-group pro-sociality revealed
in PG and T is associated, respectively, with greater/lesser
individual in-group bias in PG and T.
Second, we complement the revealed preference approach
of H1 by considering whether there is a psychological link
between altruism and parochialism in the sense that the same
personality variables help predict both pro-sociality and the
in-group bias. For this purpose, we use the Big-5 personality
traits (McCrae and Costa, 1999) as possible predictors. They
are ‘Openness,’ ‘Extraversion,’ ‘Agreeablenes,’ ‘Conscientiousness,’
and ‘Neuroticism.’ The ﬁve factor personality model is widely
used and has been found to help predict pro-sociality in PG
(e.g., see Koole et al., 2001; Pothos et al., 2011, and Volk et al.,
2012), in T (see Dohmen et al., 2008) and in other games
(e.g., Ben-Ner et al., 2004, for the Dictator game). Typically
‘Agreeableness’ is associated with pro-sociality and other traits,
less systematically so. We know of no experimental study that
has examined whether these traits are associated with in-group
bias revealed by individuals.
With the same background expectation, this leads to H2.
H2: The Big 5 personality traits predicting individual pro-
sociality in PG and T also predict the individual in-group bias
in PG and T.
To our knowledge neither approach to the question of the
link between individual ‘altruism’ and individual ‘parochialism’
has been examined experimentally before. There are experiments
that have addressed a related but diﬀerent version of H1. In
these experiments, individuals are often ﬁrst identiﬁed as either
pro-social or pro-self, then they consider whether the group of
pro-social individuals are more likely to engage in acts of actual
belligerence than the pro-self group. This evidence, we shall
suggest, is mixed and not always easy to interpret in part because
the deﬁnition of parochialism is slippery. It also does not address
the connection at the level of individuals.
For example, Abbink et al. (2012) ﬁrst classify individuals
through their play in a prisoners’ dilemma game as pro-social
or (selﬁsh) egoists. The individuals are formed into two groups
of four players and then play a Tulloch group conﬂict game:
that is, each individual makes a contribution to a group fund,
the size of which relative to the other group fund, inﬂuences
the likelihood of winning the prize in the group competition.
All members of a group have an equal share if their group wins
the prize. They ﬁnd that those who are classiﬁed as pro-social
in the prisoners’ dilemma game contribute, on average, more in
the group competition game than those classiﬁed as egoists. In
this way, altruism of acting pro-socially in a prisoners’ dilemma
game and the parochialism of investing in conﬂict seem to go
together. There is a difficulty, however, with this interpretation
of the evidence for parochialism (as potentially distinct from
altruism). The group contest game has a free rider dimension.
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The prize is like a risky PG. Individual contributions have a small
eﬀect on the probability of winning the prize and individuals free
ride on the contribution of others in this contest. In this context,
it is hardly surprising that the pro-socials contribute more to the
group contest fund than do the egoists. That is what pro-socials
do: they make contributions to PGs when egoists do not2.
De Dreu (2010) similarly ﬁrst classiﬁes individuals via a social
value test (that turns on choosing allocations between one’s self
and another) into either pro-socials or pro-selves. Once classiﬁed,
the subjects choose how much to allocate to a within-group
fund and a between-group fund. The contributions to both funds
generate a PG for the players’ own group. The diﬀerence is that
a contribution to the between-group fund also lowers the value
of the PG for the out-group. Since the latter actually harms
the out-group, De Dreu interprets contributions to the within-
group and between-group fund as, respectively, in-group love
and out-group hate3. There is no diﬀerence between types in
their contributions to the between-group fund but pro-socials
as a group contribute more to the within-group fund than
pro-selves. Thus, it seems that social value orientation aﬀects
in-group love but not out-group hate (in De Dreu’s sense of these
terms).
If parochialism is associated with out-group hate because
it harms another group (in the same way that Abbink et al.,
2012, associate parochialism with investments in contests that
harm the interests of the other group), then this means (and
contrary to the suggestion in Abbink et al., 2012) parochialism
is not connected to social value orientation and in-group love4.
This, however, is not the interpretation of parochialism that
De Dreu et al. (2010) oﬀer in a related experiment, where
the term ‘parochialism’ is explicitly used. In this experiment,
they associate parochial altruism with in-group love alone.
The difficulty with this interpretation is that in-group love in
their deﬁnition is just what is revealed by contributing to an
own group PG and there is no way of judging whether such
behavior is parochial because there is no contrasting behavior
for what individuals do in the same decision problem when
interacting with members of another group. We cannot tell
whether their pro-sociality stops at the boundary of their group
2The clean test to avoid this problemwould have had individuals deciding whether
to enter an individual contest with a member of the other group.
3This, of course, is related to but is not the same as the deﬁnition of in-group love
and out-group hate that we will be using. The virtue of our deﬁnition is twofold.
First, the in-groupness (and out-groupness) of behavior is judged relative to what
individuals do when there are no groups, whereas in De Dreu’s (2010) in-group
love is simply contributing to an own group PG and there is no way of knowing
whether this is special due to a shared group membership because there is no
comparison with altruism when there are no groups (see later comments about the
difficulties in interpretation that this lack of a comparison can create). Second, the
particular point of comparison that we use in our deﬁnition has the further beneﬁt
of connecting to discussions of social capital in relatively homogenous (where
diﬀerent group ties are weak) as compared with plural societies (where diﬀerent
group ties are strong).
4This ‘disconnection’ result is also consistent with the closest experiment that we
know that considers something like H2. Halevy et al. (2012) where in a similar set
up to De Dreu (2010), they ﬁnd that those who contribute to the within group fund
gain ‘prestige’ while those who contribute to the between group fund are regarded
as ‘dominant.’ In other words, in-group love and out-group hate involve diﬀerent
psychological currents.
or not in this experiment: that is, whether it is parochial5 . It
seems that their justiﬁcation for this interpretation in-group
love as parochial turns on an early observation that ‘As in-
group love furthers the power and eﬀectiveness of one’s own
group vis- à-vis the competing out-group, in-group love is
an indirect way of competing with the out-group (De Dreu
et al., 2010, p.1408).’ This is perfectly reasonable when groups
are indeed in competition with each other. The problem is
that in this experiment the groups are not in a competition
where this is the case when making contributions to their own
group PG.
There are several nested social dilemma experiments where
parochialism in our sense of a weakening of pro-sociality
when interacting with members of another group and its
connection with pro-sociality toward own group members might
be examined. In these experiments individuals belong to one
of two sub-groups and they have the opportunity to contribute
to an own sub-group PG or a collective PG (one that beneﬁts
own and the other sub-group members). The contrast between
own sub-group PG contributions and contributions to the
collective PG could therefore potentially reveal whether pro-
sociality weakens beyond the boundary of the own sub-group.
The difficulty with interpreting the results of these experiments
is that they were not designed for this purpose. Individuals
in these experiments have to choose how to allocate their
ﬁxed endowment between the two PG accounts and a private
one (e.g., see Wit and Kerr, 2002; Polzer, 2004; Halevy et al.,
2012). As a result, for any given level of contribution to the
private account, there must be a negative association between
the contributions to the two PGs accounts. What the relation is
between contributions to the two kinds of PGs is not therefore
something that is revealed by behavior in these experiments
because a negative association is built in by the design of the
experiment.
There are four important diﬀerences in our experiment.
First, by measuring individual pro-sociality by the extent
of contributing, giving and returning, we allow for greater
granularity in individual pro-sociality than the binary division
in these experiments between two types (the pro-social and pro-
self). Second, this in turn means that we have individual measures
which enable us to examine whether parochialism is associated
with pro-sociality at the level of the individual and not just
at the level of groups of individuals. Third, we use a natural
deﬁnition of parochialism (the extent of the in-group bias) that
would admit, in principle, Abbink et al.’s (2012) association of
parochialism with actual aggression as an extreme case (that
is, where pro-sociality has become so weakened as to become
negative). It also has the further advantage of being formally
connected to our deﬁnitions of in-group love and out-group hate:
in particular, parochialism can be decomposed into in-group love
and out-group hate. Finally, our experiment does not build in any
necessary relation between in-group pro-sociality (i.e., ‘altruism’)
and the in-group bias (i.e., ‘parochialism’).
5This is a natural deﬁnition of ‘parochial’ and it admits the Abbink et al. (2012)
deﬁnition as an extreme version where the weakening is so extreme that hostility
actually emerges in relation to other groups.
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Materials and Methods
Our subjects engage in two counterbalanced tasks. The ﬁrst task
consists of two decision making experiments where pro-sociality
has typically been revealed in varying degrees across individuals:
the PG andTrust (T) games. The second task is the DeYoung et al.
(2007) version of the Big 5 personality survey test. These tasks
are counterbalanced to enable control for any possible priming
eﬀect of one task upon the other. There are two treatments for
the PG and T decisions: one with no group affiliations and the
other with minimum, artiﬁcial group affiliations where subjects
belong to either the red or the blue group. We chose the PG
and T games and we used a minimal, artiﬁcial group affiliation
mechanism because they have revealed the in-group bias in pro-
sociality in previous experiments (see Chen and Li, 2009 and
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009).
In both treatments, subjects anonymously make the PG and T
decisions (in a random order) eight times in two separate stages.
The decisions are always made with a randomly drawn co-player
but in the group treatments the randomness is constrained to
ensure equal numbers of interactions with own-group and out-
group members. In the T decision, a player occupies the ﬁrst and
second mover roles four times each (i.e., twice in each stage). In
the group treatments, subjects know their own color group and
that of their co-player; and the random matching is constrained
to produce two interactions with co-players from the same group
and two from the other group in each of the two stages. At the
end of stage 1, a table is shown with the mean contribution rate
in the PG and the mean giving and return rates in T. In the group
treatment, these values are reported for the following four cases:
in-group matching of Blue to Blue and Red to Red, and out-
group matching of Blue to Red and Red to Blue. The interactions
are split into two stages to allow for possible learning and the
introduction of information.
The pay-oﬀ details for the PG and T decisions are as follows.
PG: Each player is endowed with 50 experimental points and
each must decide how much individual investment to make
in the common fund. Individual payoﬀ = 50 – Individual
Investment+ 0.7 (Total Investment in Common Fund).
T: The ﬁrst mover is endowed with 50 experimental points and
must decide how much (=‘x’) “to give” to the second mover.
This sum (x) is multiplied by three and so the second mover
receives 3x. The second mover decides how much (=‘y’) of 3x
to return to the ﬁrst mover. Hence
First mover payoﬀ = 50− x + y;
Second mover payoﬀ = 3x − y.
Our index of individual pro-sociality (for all three group
contingent settings) is the amount of ‘contributing’ in PG
and ‘giving’ and ‘returning’ in T (with a suitable qualiﬁcation
regarding the possible noisiness in relation to ‘giving’). We
express these in terms of % of endowment for ‘contributing’ and
‘giving’ and as % of what becomes the second movers endowment
in T (i.e., three times what has been ‘given’ by the ﬁrst mover).
Our measure of individual parochialism is the in-group
bias: the diﬀerence in individual pro-sociality when interacting
with an insider and outsider. That leaves open the question
of whether this should be measured as an absolute number
or normalized, say by the level of insider pro-sociality. We
normalize because using the absolute value of the gap necessarily
builds in a relation between this and individual pro-sociality.
To see this, let the mean individual in-group and out-group
contributing/giving/returning rate of subject i, who participated
in the two-group treatment, be Xi and Yi, respectively. Now
suppose that everybody simply treated all outsiders a constant
fraction (‘b’) less nicely than insiders (i.e., Yi = bXi, b < 1),
then the absolute value of the in-group bias (Xi–Yi) would grow
with Xi. But this would not reﬂect any diﬀerence in treatment of
outsiders relative to insiders (since they are always treated less
well by the same fraction ‘b’). Normalizing the absolute value of
the in-group bias by the level of in-group pro-sociality avoids this
false association with in-group pro-sociality.
The model we use in testing H1 is therefore given by
Xi − Yi
Xi
= β0 + β1Xi + Ziβ + εi . . . . . . . . . (1)
where Zi is the vector of dummy variables. For returning rate, Zi
includes the mean points given by out-group coparticipant for
the ‘returning’ decision.
Since Xi appears on both sides of the above equation, we
obtain the reduced form:
Yi = (1 − β0 − Ziβ)Xi − β1X
2
i − εiXi . . . . . . . (2)
If there was an association between the in-group bias and pro-
sociality, then β1 should be positive (i.e., X
2
i the coefficient on in
equation (2) should be negative).
The experiment was conducted at the University of East
Anglia6. Subjects were recruited through postings on an online
participant pool and message board. A total of 110 subjects
were involved in eight sessions. Five sessions with 62 subjects
in total had no groups to serve as a control group, and the
other three sessions with 48 subjects were our experimental
group, which had two groups7 . The instructions, the control
questionnaire and the experiment were computerized with zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007). There was a show-up fee for the personality
survey test and subjects were paid on the basis of a randomly
chosen round from each stage in the PG and T games. For this
purpose, experimental points were converted at a rate of 4 p per
point8 .
6The experiment received approval from the Ethics Committee of the School of
Social Work and Psychology at UEA. This committee reports to and acts on behalf
of the Social Science Faculty Ethics Committee at UEA. All subjects gave written
informed consent at the beginning of the experiment.
7Two no-group sessions were conducted with eight subjects. One two-group
session was conducted with 14 subjects. Other ﬁve sessions had 16 subjects.
8The experiment reported here was part of a larger set of experiments examining
discriminatory behavior. The instructions for the full set are contained in the
electronic Appendix. Subjects earned on average £16.21 in the experiment that
lasted around 90 min and they received a £15 show-up fee for a set of survey
questions that lasted between 70 and 90 min.
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Results
Table 1 provides a summary of the results on the average
rates of ‘contributing,’ ‘giving,’ and ‘returning’ under diﬀerent
conditions. They reveal typical levels of pro-sociality in the ﬁrst
column when there are no groups (see Camerer, 2003). The in-
group bias is apparent in the comparison of the second and
third columns where the ‘contributing,’ ‘giving,’ and ‘returning’
between insiders and outsiders, respectively, is set out for the
group treatments. The no-group treatment provides the baseline
from which to judge the eﬀect of group membership and
the respective contributions of in-group love and out-group
hate to the in-group bias. Table 1, therefore, suggests that
the in-group bias in PG arises from in-group love; whereas
in T it arises from a mixture of in-group love and out-group
hate.
A non-parametric analysis reports only mild signiﬁcance of
the in-group bias in PG due to few independent observations.
The small number of independent observations at this aggregate
level arises because the analysis requires two levels of clustering:
subjects nested within sessions and the session (as subjects
interact with each other as games are repeated). Hence we now
test for the signiﬁcance of these insights by running an individual
regression on ‘contributing,’ ‘giving,’ and ‘returning’ rates using
three-level models. There are two dummies: one for the group
sessions, which is labeled as ‘In-group Matching + Out-group
Matching,’ and the other for when the interaction in groups is
with outsiders, ‘Out-group Matching’ An in-group bias is picked
up by the latter, because controlling with the ﬁrst dummy for
groups sessions, it reveals any diﬀerence in behavior toward
outsiders. This is Speciﬁcation A in Table 2, where we also
TABLE 1 | Summary of results.
No groups Insiders Outsiders
Contributing rate
(PG)
Mean 0.256 0.400 0.258
Somers’ d-value 0.328 −0.004
(p-value) (0.071) (0.986)
Giving rate (T) Mean 0.399 0.486 0.337
Somers’ d-value 0.167 −0.137
(p-value) (0.455) (0.538)
Returning rate (T) Mean 0.218 0.224 0.176
Somers’ d-value 0.017 −0.210
(p-value) (0.909) (0.313)
Number of subjects 62 48
Contributing [giving] rate = the ratio of the contributed [given] points to the
endowment of 50 points. Returning rate = the ratio of the returned points to the
points the second mover has received. We apply a non-parametric method to test
if contributing, giving, and returning rates when matched with insiders or outsiders
are larger than these values in the no-group treatment. Each observation is the
mean value at the subject level, thus the sample size is 110. Since subjects interact
each other as games are repeated, the independent observation is at the session
level. Therefore Somers’d is employed to use clustering, instead of a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test. The d-value can be interpreted as follows: the contribution rate
to insiders is 32.8% more likely to be higher than the contribution rate in the
no-group treatment than vice versa. The significance of the d-value is reported
inside parentheses.
control for possible order eﬀects, stage, and round eﬀects and
possible reciprocation eﬀects in the ‘return’ equation by including
the amount ‘given.’ The regressions reveal an in-group bias: the
out-group matching dummy is signiﬁcant and negative in all
equations.
We also test for whether there is a distinct in-group love/out-
group hate origin for this bias. The fact that outsider dummy
in Speciﬁcation A is signiﬁcantly negative shows that there is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the behavior toward insiders and
outsiders, but it cannot easily test for whether this comes from
either in-group love/out-group hate or some combination of the
two. We do this through the regressions in Speciﬁcation B where
we have separate dummies for insider and outsider matching
in the group sessions. The only signiﬁcant coefficient at 95%
level is on the insider matching dummy in the ‘contributing’
equation. Hence, there is clear in-group love in PG which
could account for the bias. The insider dummy is only weakly
signiﬁcant in the ‘giving’ equation and so it is more likely that
some combination of in-group love and out-group hate generates
the bias in T.
Result 1: There is evidence of individual parochialism in the form
of in-group bias in PG and T. In-group love could alone account for
this in PG but it is more likely to be a combination of in-group love
and out-group hate that explains the in-group bias in T.
Thus we have an experiment where subjects display ‘altruism’
and ‘parochialism,’ we now turn to a test of our two hypotheses
concerning the relation between them. Is individual altruism
associated with individual parochialism?
Figure 1 provides a preliminary view on H1. We plot
individual in-group ‘contributing,’ ‘giving,’ and ‘returning’ against
the individual in-group bias in each decision when, respectively,
normalized by the level of in-group ‘contributing,’ ‘giving,’ and
‘returning.’ The visual evidence is not strong.
We test statistically for this association by estimating
equation (2). Due to the potential problem of the
heteroskedasticity of the error term, we use the GLS. Recall
if there is an association between the normalized in-group bias
and pro-sociality, then β1 should be positive (i.e., the coefficient
on X2i should be negative). This, however, is not what is revealed
in Table 3. The coefficient on squared insider pro-sociality
(X2i ) is insigniﬁcant in all regressions. The coefficient on Xi
is signiﬁcant and positive, suggesting that our subjects simply
contributed/gave/returned to outsiders a fraction of what they do
to insiders.
Result 2 (against H1): There is no association between normalized
individual pro-sociality and individual parochialism in PG and T.
There is evidence that individual pro-sociality toward outsiders is a
constant fraction of individual pro-sociality toward insiders.
H2 takes up our second approach to the question of whether
individual altruism is connected to individual parochialism.
Table 4 reports on the signs of the signiﬁcant coefficients when
we introduce the Big-5 personality predictors into the regression
equations like those in Table 2 on ‘contributing,’ ‘giving,’ and
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TABLE 2 | Individual pro-sociality regressions.
Variable (Game) Contributing (PG) Giving (T) Returning (T)
Personality survey before PG&T 0.174 (0.291) 0.0880 (0.326) −0.110 (0.317)
PG Game before trust game 0.343 (0.319) −0.131 (0.364) 0.387 (0.353)
Session of eight (vs. 14 ≤ ) Subjects 1.040∗∗∗ (0.385) 0.852∗∗ (0.401) 0.955∗∗ (0.418)
Second stage −0.184∗∗∗ (0.0179) −0.142∗∗∗ (0.0213) −0.239∗∗∗ (0.0279)
Round −0.0699∗∗∗ (0.00820) −0.0247∗∗ (0.0104) −0.153∗∗∗ (0.0135)
Specification A In-group matching + 0.771∗∗ (0.315) 0.679∗ (0.361) 0.133 (0.348)
Out-group matching
Out-group matching −0.382∗∗∗ (0.0267) −0.374∗∗∗ (0.0325) −0.219∗∗∗ (0.0424)
Specification B In-group matching 0.771∗∗ (0.315) 0.679∗ (0.361) 0.133 (0.348)
Out-group matching 0.388 (0.315) 0.305 (0.361) −0.0858 (0.348)
Given by first Mover 0.0523∗∗∗ (0.00123)
Constant 1.771∗∗∗ (0.256) 2.421∗∗∗ (0.291) 0.875∗∗∗ (0.282)
Observations 880 440 360
Regressions are three-level mixed-effects poisson model. Since the range of the dependent variables is non-negative integers, we assume poisson distribution instead of
t-distribution. These are with random intercepts at both the session and the subject-within-session levels since subjects interact each other as games are repeated. For
each regression, we tried two models: specifications A and B. The dummy variable In-group Matching is one if the session has two groups and the subject is matched
with a member of the same group, otherwise zero. Out-group Matching is one if the session has two groups and the subject is matched with a member of the other
group, otherwise zero. In-Group Matching + Out-Group Matching is equal to one in the two-group treatment and zero in the no-group treatment. Significance levels:
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
FIGURE 1 | In-group bias and pro-sociality. For each subject in the
two-group treatment, in-group pro-sociality is derived as the mean in-group
contributing/giving/returning rate. The in-group bias is defined as the mean
contributing/giving/returning rate of in-group minus that of out-group. When
in-group pro-sociality is zero, the observation is omitted except the case in
which out-group pro-sociality is also zero. The ratio is set to be zero in this case.
‘returning.’ Each personality trait is introduced by itself to capture
its general possible inﬂuence and in interaction with the two
dummies for group sessions and inter-group matching. It is
the latter, recall, that captures any inﬂuence on the in-group
bias. Hence, when the interaction dummy coefficient is negative,
this trait contributes to the bias, while a positive coefficient
means that the trait counters the bias by promoting pro-sociality
toward outsiders. The full regression results are contained in the
Appendix, we focus in Table 4 only on the sign of the personality
variables that are signiﬁcant in predicting pro-sociality in general
and the in-group bias.
‘Agreeableness’ is the only personality trait that (positively)
predicts general pro-sociality, i.e., in ‘contributing’ and ‘giving.’
‘Agreeableness’ also predicts positively pro-sociality with respect
to outsiders in ‘contributing’ and ‘returning.’ Thus the one
personality predictor of pro-sociality in general works against
the in-group bias because it also helps predict pro-sociality with
outsiders. There are several traits that have a negative eﬀect in
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TABLE 3 | Insider and outsider pro-sociality.
Variable Mean out-group
contributing rate
Mean out-group
giving rate
Mean out-group
returning rate
Personality survey before PG&T × Xi 0.195
∗∗∗ (0.00635) 0.0970∗∗∗ (0.00207) 0.293∗∗∗ (0.0516)
PG game before trust game × Xi 0.0191 (0.0534) 0.231
∗∗∗ (0.00450) 0.350∗∗∗ (0.0933)
Xi 0.659
∗∗∗ (0.0551) 0.458∗∗∗ (0.0809) 0.859∗∗∗ (0.258)
Xi
2 −0.227 (0.140) −0.0315 (0.109) −0.599 (0.391)
Mean out-group given rate × Xi −0.590 (0.607)
Observations 48 48 47
Each observation is the mean value at the subject level. Regressions are GLS with clustering at the session level. Significance levels: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, and
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 4 | Big 5 Predictors of general pro-sociality and in-group bias.
General Out-group matching
Contributing Giving Contributing Returning
Big 5
Openness +
Extraversion + −
Conscientiousness + −
Agreeableness + + +
Neuroticism − −
out-group matching (i.e., contribute to the in-group bias) but
none helps predict pro-sociality in general.
Result 3 (against H2):There is no personality trait that helps predict
both individual pro-sociality and individual in-group bias in either
PG or T.
Discussion and Conclusion
The central role of ‘agreeableness’ in predicting pro-sociality
is a common ﬁnding in the literature where the Big-5 has
been used to predict behavior in the PG, T (and Dictator)
games (see Koole et al., 2001; Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Dohmen
et al., 2008; Pothos et al., 2011; Volk et al., 2012). In this
respect, along with the general levels of pro-sociality, our
results are consistent with those in the experimental literature.
Furthermore, our results tend to support the suggestion in
the literature that the in-group bias comes predominantly
from in-group love rather than out-group hate (see Balliet
et al., 2014). There have been earlier examinations of whether
‘altruism’ is associated at the individual level with ‘parochialism.’
The evidence is not always easy to interpret and is mixed.
We are the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to examine whether
individual pro-sociality is linked to individual parochialism
(as captured by the in-group bias) in such detail. This
association is important because it is an implication of both
social identity and evolutionary accounts of the origins of
altruism.
Our measure of pro-sociality is ‘contributing and ‘giving’ and
‘returning’ in the PG and T games, respectively. Our measure
of parochialism is the in-group bias in these decisions: the
extent to which subjects are less pro-social with outsiders than
insiders. We ﬁnd there is no association. There is an in-group
bias, but this does not vary with the level of pro-sociality
toward insiders. This result is reinforced by the analysis on
the personality predictors of pro-sociality and the in-group
bias. ‘Agreeableness’ is the only predictor of pro-sociality and
it does not predict its diminution with outsiders (which is
what would be expected if altruism was to be linked with
parochialism at the individual level). Instead, ‘agreeableness’
positively predicts pro-sociality with both insiders and outsiders.
This personality variable, therefore, would lead one to expect that
pro-sociality toward insiders moves in tandem with that toward
outsider. This is, indeed, what we ﬁnd. In a complementary
result, we ﬁnd that there are a range of personality predictors
of the in-group bias, but none helps predict pro-sociality in
general.
Of course, these results are preliminary and need further
investigation. One problem is that there are no operational,
agreed deﬁnitions of the term ‘parochial altruism.’ We have
used what we regard as natural deﬁnitions, but with diﬀerent
deﬁnitions, there may be diﬀerent results. This suggests the need
for further work to clarify how best to deﬁne the term. Another
problem that future research should address is that our results
apply to only two decision settings. It would be good to examine
whether the same results hold across further decision problems
(e.g., the dictator game, contest games, etc). Nevertheless, if
pro-sociality is not tied to parochialism at an individual level,
in the way that we have found, then it carries an encouraging
implication. An increase in individual ‘altruism’ need not be
accompanied by the growth of individual ‘parochialism.’
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